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Abstract
It is well-known that subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium does not eliminate incentives for
joint-deviations or renegotiations. This paper presents a systematic framework for studying
non-cooperative games with group incentives, and oﬀers a notion of equilibrium that reﬁnes the
Nash theory in a natural way and answers to most questions raised in the renegotiation-proof
and coalition-proof literature. Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in
any subgame a course of action that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate,
given the restriction that every deviation must itself be self-enforcing and hence invulnerable to
further self-enforcing deviations.
The main result of this paper is that much of the strategic complexity introduced by joint-
deviations and renegotiations is redundant, and in inﬁnitely-repeated games with discounting
every equilibrium outcome can be supported by a stationary set of optimal penal codes as in
Abreu (1988). In addition, I prove existence of equilibrium both in stage games and in repeated
games, and provide an iterative procedure for computing the unique equilibrium-payoﬀ set.
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DeMarzo, Peter Hammond, Kenneth Judd, Jonathan Levin, Thomas Sargent, Ilya Segal, Mark Wright and Winnie
Choi for many valuable comments. The author would especially like to thank Robert Hall for ongoing support, Paul
Milgrom and Narayana Kocherlakota for many insightful and detailed discussion of various versions of this paper. The
author gracefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from Stanford Economics Department and the Hoover Institution..1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, many papers have attempted to deﬁne and characterize the set of
self-enforcing agreements among rational individuals that could withstand the possibility of rene-
gotiation: that after some history participants may jointly prefer to scrap the original implicit
contract and set up a new arrangement. Among the ﬁrst are papers by Farrell and Maskin (1989)
and Bernheim and Ray (1989), who pointed out that the common practice of selecting the Pareto-
optimal perfect Nash equilibria lacks “internal consistency”. They questioned that if individuals
can coordinate on an eﬃcient equilibrium at the beginning of time, why would they submit to
an ineﬃcient equilibrium in some subgames, when an alternative Pareto-improving equilibrium is
available? Their criticism is especially severe in situations where optimal equilibria are supported
by punishments that hurt both the innocent and the guilty.
Since then, several notions of “renegotiation-proof” equilibrium have emerged from the litera-
ture.1 Nevertheless, progress in understanding these equilibria has been impeded by the fact that,
until recently, it is still unclear what constitutes a “credible” group-deviation or renegotiation.
Moreover, many papers in the literature had adopted a non-behavioral approach. Intuitive proper-
ties of “renegotiation-proof” equilibria are ﬁrst identiﬁed and taken as primitives in the construction
of the corresponding solution concept. This obscures the link between the solution concept and
the corresponding restrictions imposed on beliefs and behavior of rational individuals, and makes
comparison between diﬀerent solution concepts diﬃcult. Finally, existing solution concepts focus
mostly on renegotiations initiated by the grand-coalition. The possibility that members of a sub-
coalition may renegotiate among themselves further complicates equilibrium characterization, and
undermines the applicability of these concepts in games with more than two players.2
This paper presents a systematic framework for studying non-cooperative games with group
incentives, and extends the notion of coalition-stable equilibria presented in Chung (2004) to re-
peated games, where I showed applying forward-induction logic in pre-play communication stage
allows players to correlate their strategies, and exercise a form of coalitional reasoning. The theory
developed here is also related on the seminal work of Bernheim et al. (1987), who argued that the
only credible threats to a self-enforcing agreement are deviations that are themselves self-enforcing.
Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in any subgame a course of action
that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate, given the restriction that every devia-
tion must itself be self-enforcing and hence invulnerable to further self-enforcing deviations.
Despite their similarity in intuitive characterization, coalition-stable equilibria is very diﬀerent
1See for example Farrell and Maskin (1989), Bernheim and Ray (1989), Pearce (1987), Asheim (1991), DeMarzo
(1992), Bergin and MacLeod (1993), Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1993), Ray (1994) and many others.
2Few exceptions include Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and DeMarzo (1992) who deﬁned solution concepts
that account for deviations by sub-coalitions.
1from the solution concept proposed by Bernheim et al. (1987), and is capable of resolving several
conceptual diﬃculties left unanswered in their work. First, since my theory is motivated by a model
of public pre-play communication, it removes the restriction in Bernheim et al. (1987) that only
members of the deviating coalition could contemplate further deviations.3;4 Second, because players
coordinate their equilibrium behavior as well as any coalitional deviation from equilibrium using the
same pre-play communication mechanism, I am able to prove generic existence of coalition-stable
equilibria in mixed strategies. Finally, as I will focus in this paper, the concept of coalition-stable
equilibria can be easily extended to both ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely repeated games.
The main result of this paper is that much of the strategic complexity introduced by joint-
deviations and renegotiations is redundant, and in inﬁnitely-repeated games with discounting, ev-
ery equilibrium outcome can be supported by a stationary set of optimal penal codes as in Abreu
(1988). In particular, I extend the well-known “no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation” principle of Abreu
(1988) and Harris (1985) to the domain of self-enforcing coalitional deviations. Hence to prevent
joint-deviations or renegotiations from equilibrium, it suﬃces to punish one of the participants
with her worst coalition-stable equilibrium, immediately after the ﬁrst period of deviation.5 The
incentive structure of coalition-stable equilibrium guarantees both the punishers and the punished
prefer to follow equilibrium recommendation after every history. In section 6, I’ll demonstrate how
to support collusion in an inﬁnitely-repeated model of Cournot duopoly with renegotiation by the
use of optimal penal codes.
Finally, for inﬁnitely-repeated games, this paper generalizes the iterative procedure developed
by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to calculate the payoﬀ set associated with coalition-stable
equilibria. Let V p be the payoﬀ set associated with strategy proﬁles that is immune to self-enforcing
deviations by dynamic coalitions of size less than or equal to p.6 Through a succession of propo-
sitions, I show that for each p = 1;:::;n, there exists a monotone set-valued operator Bp(¢) such
that, given V p¡1, we can successively approximate V p by iterating over Bp until convergence, i.e.
V p = lim
k!1
Bk
p(V p¡1).7 Besides oﬀering computational tractability, this iterative procedure also
leads to an existence proof of equilibrium in inﬁnitely-repeated games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers basic setup and notations. Section 3 reviews
the development of the equilibrium concept in stage games. Section 4 motivates and extends the
3Bernheim et al. (1987) justiﬁed this restriction on acceptable further deviations by assuming that members of a
coalition can secretly coordinate their moves prior to the play of the game. More importantly, members of a coalition
can commit not to reveal their coalitional agreement to non-members.
4Also see Kaplan (1992) and Milgrom and Roberts (1996) for a related solution concept that partially relaxes the
restriction on acceptable further deviations imposed by Bernheim et al. (1987).
5DeMarzo (1992) called a strategy of this form a “scapegoat” strategy, which he used to characterize his concept
of sustainable social norm for ﬁnitely repeated games.
6I use V
0 to denote the payoﬀ proﬁles associated with all feasible strategies, and V
n is the payoﬀ set for coalition-
stable equilibria in an n-player game.
7When p = 1, B1(¢) is identical to the B(¢) operator in Abreu et al. (1990).
2solution concept to repeated games. Section 5 provides a recursive characterization of equilibrium
in inﬁnitely repeated games. Section 6 applies the equilibrium concept and solves for a simple re-
peated Cournot duopoly model with renegotiation. Section 7 relates the theory with other solution
concepts in the literature and concludes. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Setup and Notations
2.1 The Stage Game
The stage game is denoted by G = (fAign
i=1;fuign
i=1), where N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players,
Ai is the strategy set for player i, and ui : A1 £ A2 £ ::: £ An ! R is player i’s payoﬀ function.
I assume that Ai is a nonempty compact Euclidean space, and ui is continuous and bounded for
each i.8 Elements of Ai are denoted ai and are referred to as actions. Finally, the space of feasible
strategy proﬁles is denoted by Σ0 = A ´ A1 £A2 £:::£An, and I set a ´ (a1 £a2 £:::£an), and
u(a) ´ (u1(a);u2(a);:::;un(a)).
2.2 The Repeated Game
Time starts at t = 0. Let GT(±) denote the repeated game generated by repeating G for time peri-
ods 0;:::;T, where T is the horizon which can either be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. I assume players evaluate
payoﬀs using a common discount factor ± 2 (0;1). More precisely, for any action proﬁle ® ´ fatgT
t=0





is equal to (1 ¡ ±)
P1
t=0 ±tui(at) when T = 1.9
Let ht denote a t-history of all players’ actions up to but not including period t, and let Ht be
the set of all t-histories. A strategy for player i, denoted by ¾i, is a sequence of functions f¾i;tgT
t=0
such that ¾i;0 2 Ai and ¾i;t : Ht ! Ai 8t ¸ 1.10 I write the restriction of ¾ to ht as ¾jht. The set
of player i’s feasible strategies is again denoted by Σ0
i, and Σ0 ´ Σ0
1 £Σ0
2 £:::£Σ0
n is the set of all
feasible strategy proﬁles.
Given ¾ ´ f¾igi2N 2 Σ0, let ®(¾) denote the action proﬁle induced by ¾.11 More generally,
8More generally, I only need to assume that Ai is a nonempty compact Hausdorﬀ topological space for each i.
Hence the results developed here apply to all ﬁnite-action normal-form stage games.
9Since ui is continuous and bounded, ± 2 (0;1) and A is compact, Ui(¢) is uniformly continuous.
10When ¾ = f¾igi2N is interpreted as a behavior strategy proﬁle, the notation employed here implies players
can observe ex-post the realization of every player’s private randomization device. Nevertheless, the analysis could
be easily extended to the case where histories consist only of all previous actions taken by players, if attention is
restricted to public perfect equilibria.
11Given ¾ 2 Σ
0, the action proﬁle fatg
T
t=0 = ®(¾) can be constructed by setting a0 = f¾i;0gi2N and at =
f¾i;t(ht)gi2N 8t ¸ 1 where ht = (a0;:::;at¡1).
3given any strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ0 and t-history ht, I deﬁne ®(¾;ht) to be the action proﬁle that
is equal to ht up to time t ¡ 1, and is determined by subsequent applications of ¾ thereafter. Let
vi(¾) = Ui(®(¾)) be player i’s value function associated with ¾, and let vi(¾;ht) = Ui(®(¾;ht)).12
I use v(¾) and v(¾;ht) to denote fvi(¾)gi2N and fvi(¾;ht)gi2N, respectively.
Throughout, I will use the notation that for any n-tuple (x1;:::;xn), xs ´ fxigi2s and x¡s ´
fxigi62s, where s µ N is an arbitrary coalition of players.
3 Review of Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Stage Games
In this section, I brieﬂy summarize the results presented in Chung (2004). Section 3.1 presents a
general critique on theories of rational behavior in games, and motivates the principles behind the
concept of coalition-stable equilibria. Section 3.2 gives a formal deﬁnition of the solution concept,
and highlights its key properties.
3.1 Motivation and A General Critique
Most equilibrium theories in games implicitly assume that players can coordinate their behavior by
meaningful pre-play communication. In particular, the Nash theory can be understood as presenting
a necessary condition for any reasonable deﬁnition of an agreement in the pre-play communication
process.13 However, it is also well known that some Nash equilibria are more plausible than others
as outcomes of strategic play. Consider, for example, the following simple 2 £ 2 game:
B1 B2
A1 3, 3 0, 0
A2 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: A Common-Interest Coordination Game
Suppose the common prior of both players is focused on (A2;B2). If pre-play communication is
modelled as many stages of cheap-talk games, where on each stage players simultaneously an-
nounce their own intended strategy in the actual play of game. Then the Nash theory concludes
that (A2;B2) is a plausible agreement between the players, since any announcement indicating a
unilateral deviation seems to conﬂict with individual rationality, and it should not be believed.
Therefore, in the actual play of game, thinking that her opponent is going to play action 2, each
12Since Σ
0 is compact and ®(¢) is continuous in the topology of pointwise convergence, vi(¢) is uniformly continuous.
13Otherwise, there is a players who is not playing her best response, and she should be able to convince her
opponents that she wants to do something else.
4player should best response and play action 2 herself, fulﬁlling the equilibrium prediction of (A2;B2).
Nevertheless, a simple forward-induction logic may break the above Nash argument. Suppose
the row player announces she is going to play A1. This is a “counterfactual” according to the
Nash theory, since the theory predicts no rational player should have an incentive to make such an
announcement.14 But to conclude the row player is irrational conﬂicts with common knowledge of
individual rationality. Hence, it is highly likely that the column player may search for a rational
explanation of her opponent’s behavior, before concluding the impossible.
In the present situation, it is only reasonable to interpret the counterfactual announcement as
an invitation for the column player to announce B1 in the next round of communication. First,
(A1;B1) is a Nash equilibrium and hence is comfortable with a prediction of the existing rational
theory. Second, if the column player believes in her opponent’s announcement and acts according
to the implicit invitation, there is no incentive for her opponent to cheat and do something else.
Finally, it is reasonable for the row player to send and expect the column player to act on her invi-
tation, since the outcome is mutually beneﬁcial. Therefore, it seems unlikely that (A2;B2) would
become an agreement in the pre-play communication stage and realize as an outcome of the game,
even though it is a Nash equilibrium.
The above arguments indicate that the Nash theory, or any theory of rational behavior in
general, may give rise to “counterfactuals” that are globally destabilizing. Sophisticated rational
players should be able to exploit and manipulate counterfactuals of a given rational theory to their
own strategic advantage. Hence not every prediction of a rational theory may be regarded as a
plausible outcome of play, if the prediction is checked against the implications of counterfactuals
produced by the theory.
The concept of coalition-stable equilibrium attempts to address the problems posed by counter-
factuals by employing an iterated forward-induction argument. It represents a theory of rational
behavior that is “complete”, in the sense that common knowledge of the theory would not under-
mine its predictions through the counterfactuals it produces. In other words, no rational player can
expect to gain by attempting counterfactuals produced by the theory developed here. Moreover, as
evident from the above example, combining forward-induction logic with pre-play communication
allows players to correlate their strategies, and exercise a form of coalitional reasoning. Hence for
the rest of development in this paper, I can treat the present theory as a description of certain
equilibrium behavior that is stable against some form of self-enforcing coalitional deviations, even
though the motivation and the formal analysis of the theory is strictly non-cooperative.15
14Farrell (1993) called this type of counterfactual in the cheap-talk games a neologism.
15Interested readers are strongly encouraged to refer to Chung (2004) for a formal treatment of the theory.
53.2 Deﬁnition and Properties of Equilibrium
This section presents a construction of the set of coalition-stable equilibria in stage games, and
highlights key properties of equilibrium. Loosely speaking, the set of equilibria can be constructed
by the following successive reﬁnement procedure. Let Σp denote the set of strategy proﬁles that
is immune to self-enforcing deviations by coalitions of size less than or equal to p. By deﬁnition,
Σ0 ¶ Σ1 ¶ ::: ¶ Σn, where Σn is the set of coalition-stable equilibria in an n-player game. For
p = 1;:::;n, given that Σp¡1 has been previously deﬁned, I can construct Σp as the intersection over
sets of unimprovable strategy proﬁles in Σp¡1, among coalitions of size p.16 Notice that the ﬁrst
step of this iterative algorithm gives the set of Nash equilibria. Hence by construction, the theory
of coalition-stable equilibrium reﬁnes the Nash theory using coalitional incentive in a natural way.17
To present a formal deﬁnition of the theory, ﬁrst we need to develop a couple of mathematical
notations. Given a subset of players s µ N with size denoted by jsj, I can deﬁne a strict partial
ordering Âs over the space of feasible strategy proﬁles:18 for all e ¾;¾ 2 Σ0,
e ¾ Âs ¾ ,
(
ui(e ¾s;¾¡s) > ui(¾) 8i 2 s
e ¾¡s = ¾¡s
Hence e ¾ Âs ¾ if and only if e ¾s can be interpreted as a proﬁtable coordinated deviation by every
player in s from ¾, taking as ﬁxed the strategic choices of players in the complement coalition ¡s.
Given the partial ordering Âs deﬁned above, and a closed subset e Σ of feasible strategy proﬁles, we
say ¾ 2 e Σ is unimprovable in e Σ by coalition s, if there does not exist any e ¾ 2 e Σ such that e ¾ Âs ¾.
Let Ks(e Σ) represents the set of unimprovable strategy proﬁles in e Σ for coalition s. Mathematically,
we have Ks(e Σ) ´ f¾ 2 e Σ : @e ¾ 2 e Σ; e ¾ Âs ¾g.19
We are ready for a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium. It consists of a sequence of intermediate
deﬁnitions fΣpgn
p=1, representing successive reﬁnements of Nash as an equilibrium theory of ratio-
nal behavior. When p = 1, deﬁne Σ1 =
T
i2N Ki(Σ0), hence Σ1 coincides with the set of Nash
equilibria. Suppose Σm has been deﬁned for m = f1;2;:::;p ¡ 1g, set Σp ´
T
s;jsj=p Ks(Σp¡1).
16A strategy proﬁle ¾ is unimprovable in Σ
p by a coalition s if, taking the choices of the complement coalition as
given, there does not exists a joint-deviation by s that is strictly beneﬁcial for every member of s, and the resulting
strategy proﬁle ˜ ¾ is in Σ
p.
17Readers are again reminded that the phrase “coalitional incentive” only has descriptive contents. It is a conse-
quence of applying forward-induction reasoning in the pre-play communication process. The primitives consist only
of common knowledge of individual rationality and common prior over the space of strategy proﬁles. Hence the spirit
of analysis is strictly non-cooperative. Please refer to section 3.1 and Chung (2004) for further discussion.
18A strict partial ordering is a binary relation Â that is asymmetric and transitive, that is, a Â b ) b 6Â a, and
a Â b & b Â c ) a Â c, respectively.
19In other words, Ks(e Σ) is the mathematical core of the abstract system (e Σ;Âs) in Greenberg (1989). Moreover,
since Âs is a strict partial ordering, it also coincides with the von Neuman/Morgenstern stable set of (e Σ;Âs) deﬁned
in Von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
6Deﬁnition 1. Σn is the set of coalition-stable equilibria in a n-player stage game.
Beyond the literal interpretation that Σn is a reﬁnement of Nash using incentives of coalitions of
increasing sizes,20 as hinted by the informal discussion in section 3.1, readers should be aware that
each step of reﬁnement from Σp¡1 to Σp also corresponds to one application of forward-induction
logic, which reﬁnes the rational theory at the previous stage by deleting those predictions of the
theory that are unstable, when checked against the implications of counterfactuals produced by the
theory.21 Hence the current solution concept may be best viewed as a positive theory of strate-
gic play, in an environment where players can coordinate their expectations in an open pre-play
communication process, and they attempt to explain every announcement by each player using the
simplest theory consistent with common knowledge of individual rationality.22
Chung (2004) showed that the equilibrium correspondence is closed, and under weak technical
conditions it is also non-empty. I restate an existence theorem presented there.23
Theorem 1 (Existence in Stage Games). If Σ0 is a nonempty, convex and compact topological
vector space and the payoﬀ proﬁle u(¢) is quasi-concave, then Σp is nonempty 8p · n.24
As an important corollary, since payoﬀ proﬁle u(¢) is linear and hence quasi-concave when mixed-
strategies are considered, Theorem 1 implies generic existence of coalition-stable equilibria. This
is both a surprising and a desirable property of the equilibrium theory, since it is well-known that
existing solution concepts that reﬁne Nash using coalitional incentives, such as strong Nash equi-
libria proposed by Selten (1975) and coalition-proof equilibria proposed by Bernheim et al. (1987),
have diﬃculties with existence in generic normal-form stage games.
4 Equilibria in Repeated Games
This section extends the theory of coalition-stable equilibria to situations where players are engaged
in repeated interactions. Besides the initial pre-play communication, I assume players also have
opportunities to communicate and revise their strategies at the beginning of each round of actual
play. Section 4.1 uses several simple two-period examples to highlight the strategic complications
20We say a proﬁtable joint-deviation from e ¾ to ¾ by a coalition of size p is self-enforcing if and only if ¾ 2 Σ
p¡1.
21Successive reﬁnement by incentives of coalitions of increasing sizes corresponds to the progressively sophisticated
ways that rational players can manipulate counterfactuals in a given rational theory to their strategic advantage, since
every coalitional proposal can be viewed as a chain of individual proposals in the pre-play communication process.
Details are presented in Chung (2004).
22Similar behavioral assumptions also appear in the formulation of extensive-form rationality in Pearce (1984) and
Battigalli (1997).
23The proof is reproduced in the Appendix.
24A payoﬀ proﬁle u(¢) = fui(¢)gi2N is quasi-concave if and only if 8¾; ˜ ¾ 2 Σ
0 and 8¸ 2 [0;1], u(¸¾ + (1 ¡ ¸)˜ ¾) ¸
u(¾) ^ u(˜ ¾) = fmin[ui(¾);ui(˜ ¾)]gi2N.
7introduced by the possibility of renegotiation. Section 4.2 introduces the concept of dynamic coali-
tions and presents a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium.
4.1 Simple Two-Period Examples
This section uses several two-period examples to illustrate how the possibility of renegotiation
would change the strategic consideration of the players, and hence the solution concept used to
predict the outcomes of the game. For simplicity, we consider only pure-strategy equilibria and
assume no discounting in this section.
The ﬁrst example concerns with the issue of dynamic consistency at the collective level. Con-
sider the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game in ﬁgure 2.25 There are two Nash equilibria, (D1;D1)
and (D2;D2), in the stage game. Imagine a single repetition of this game. If the players can
meet and coordinate their strategies only before the play of the game, then there is a perfect Nash
equilibrium in which players initially cooperate (C;C), and play (D1;D1) in the terminal period,
with any ﬁrst period deviation punished by reversion to (D2;D2). This strategy proﬁle gives each
player a total payoﬀ of 5. Moreover, since this equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient among the class of
Nash equilibria, it is also coalition-stable in the normal-form representation of this two-stage game.26
Player 2
C D1 D2
C 3, 3 0, 4 0, 0
Player 1 D1 4, 0 2, 2 0, 0
D2 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 2: Extended Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
If players can reconvene and reconsider their options after play in the ﬁrst period, then the
strategy proﬁle described above is no longer immune to strategic manipulation. According to our
discussion in section 3, the prescription to play (D2;D2) in the second period is highly implausi-
ble, since players can use the communication opportunity before the second period to coordinate
on a mutually preferable outcome (D1;D1). Knowing the “punishment” to revert to (D2;D2) is
incredible, a player will deviate even in the ﬁrst period, rendering cooperation in the ﬁrst period
untenable. Hence in the presence of renegotiation, the only reasonable prediction of this game is to
play (D1;D1) in both periods, which gives a total payoﬀ of only 4 to each player. In the present
example, renegotiation decreases ex-ante utility of each player, because players cannot commit to
25This example is borrowed by Table 1 of Bernheim and Ray (1989).
26For 2-player normal-form games, the concept of coalition-stable equilibria coincides with the solution concept of
Pareto-undominated Nash.
8a more severe oﬀ-equilibrium punishment ex-post.
B1 B2
A1 3, 1 0, 0
A2 0, 0 1, 3
Figure 3: Battle of Sexes
The second example illustrates how re-opening communication before play at each stage help
to discipline the forward-induction logic across diﬀerent periods. Consider a single repetition of the
Battle of Sexes game in ﬁgure 3. Suppose players originally agree to play (A1;B1) in both periods.
If players cannot communicate after play in the ﬁrst period, then the column player (she) may have
an incentive to deviate to B2 in the ﬁrst period, even if she is rational. It is because if she knows
that the row player (he) uses a forward-induction logic to interpret her deviation, then she can
eﬀectively use the deviation to signal her intention to play B2 in the second period, and also her
expectation that the row player will cooperate by playing A2. Even if the row player prefers their
original agreement to this new suggestion by the column player, he no longer has any opportunity
to communicate to the column player and reiterates his intention to adhere to the old agreement.
Hence the row player may submit to this signal sent by his opponent, and best responds to it by
playing A2 in the second period, which in turn justiﬁes the ﬁrst-period deviation by the column
player.
The above forward-induction argument is, however, fragile if players can communicate after
play in the ﬁrst period. This essentially turns the implicit one-way communication channel into an
explicit two-way pre-play communication process in the subgame following the ﬁrst-period moves.
More importantly, it takes away the last-mover’s advantage of the column player. Upon observing
the ﬁrst-period deviation by the column player, the row player can now reiterate his adherence
to their original agreement and announce his intention to play A1 in the second period. Such an
announcement is credible, since it is consistent with their original agreement, and since there is no
reason why the row player should sacriﬁce his own interest for the interest of the column player.
Hence in this case, the possibility of further communication before the second stage undermines the
signalling eﬀect of deviations in the ﬁrst stage, and discourages the column player from ﬁrst-period
deviation. In other words, by arguing that players should adhere to their previous agreement in
the subgame unless there is a mutually beneﬁcial adjustment, we let the backward-induction logic
overrides the forward-induction logic for intertemporal agreements.27
The third example challenges the conventional wisdom that renegotiation leads to agreements
whose payoﬀs are Pareto-frontier of some admissible set.28 Consider a single repetition of the game
27See van Damme (1989) for a similar advocation.
28This requirement is labelled as weak renegotiation-proofness by Farrell and Maskin (1989) and as internal con-
9Player 2
L M R
L 5, 5 0, 0 0, 0
Player 1 M 0, 0 4, 4 2, 6
R 0, 0 6, 2 0, 0
Figure 4: A Simple Game Challenging WRP
in ﬁgure 4. The Nash equilibria of the stage game are (L;L), (M;R) and (R;M), all of them
are also coalition-stable in the stage game. Obviously, the strategy proﬁle ¾ that speciﬁes playing
(L;L) in both periods is a perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we can verify that f(M;M);(L;L)g
is also a perfect Nash equilibrium outcome supported by the following strategy proﬁle ˜ ¾:





(L;L) if no player deviates
(M;R) if player 1 deviates alone
(R;M) if player 2 deviates alone or jointly with player 1
Since payoﬀs associate with ¾ Pareto dominates those of ˜ ¾, the conventional wisdom suggests that
players would collectively renounce ˜ ¾ in favor of ¾, if they can communicate and coordinate their
strategies prior to the play of the game.
However, this argument by the conventional wisdom presumes that players can make binding
commitment to switch from their original agreement ˜ ¾ to the new agreement ¾. Equivalently, it
assumes players cannot reconvene and reconsider their strategies after play in period one. Other-
wise, player 1 may not want to go along with ¾ in the second period, since adherence to ¾ only
gives her a second-period payoﬀ of 5, while the original agreement ˜ ¾ promises her a payoﬀ of 6
under such contingency. Furthermore, knowing that player 1 would not participate in the second-
period deviation, player 2 would not deviate in the ﬁrst period, since doing so yields her a total
payoﬀ of 5 + 2 = 7, while the original agreement ˜ ¾ gives her a total payoﬀ of 4 + 5 = 9 > 7. In
the current scenario, renegotiation fails to increase ex-ante utility of both players, because players
cannot commit to a particular course of action, and because they cannot prevent themselves from
further reneging their current agreement in future.
4.2 Dynamic Coalitions and Deﬁnition of Equilibria
This section introduces the idea of dynamic coalitions, which embeds our intuition given in section
4.1, and extends our construction of coalition-stable equilibria to repeated games with discounting.
I’ll take as primitive the successive reﬁnement procedure described in section 3, and modiﬁes the
construction in a minimal way to incorporate additional strategic considerations introduced by re-
sistency by Bernheim and Ray (1989).
10peated interactions and negotiations.
The notion of dynamic coalitions incorporates the idea that players may be able to formulate
an elaborate intertemporal scheme to deviate from an existing agreement. Moreover, since players’
behavior is dynamically consistent, and since no binding commitment to any particular course of
action is available, every side-agreement to deviate must give strict incentive to those who partici-
pate, at every contingency when the participant’s action is called upon.
To describe a mutually beneﬁcial deviation by a subset of players s 2 2N at a particular
contingency ht,29 I generalize the strict partial ordering deﬁned in section 3.2 to the following: for




Ui(®((e ¾s;¾¡s);ht)) > Ui(®(¾;ht)) 8i 2 s
e ¾¡sjht = ¾¡sjht
Deﬁnition 2. A dynamic coalition S is a sequence of history-dependent functions fStgT
t=1 such
that St : Ht ! 2N 8t.
Let C be the space of non-empty dynamic coalitions.30 Given a dynamic coalition S 2 C, I can
construct a strict partial ordering ÂS corresponding to S by deﬁning
e ¾ ÂS ¾ , e ¾ Âht
St(ht) ¾ 8ht 2 Ht;8t < 131
Intuitively, e ¾ ÂS ¾ if and only if at every ﬁnite history ht, e ¾jht is a proﬁtable coordinated devia-
tion from ¾jht for all players in coalition st = St(ht), taking as ﬁxed strategies of players in the
complement coalition ¡st. Hence e ¾ ﬁts in our description as an elaborate intertemporal scheme
to deviate from an existing agreement ¾, since at every contingency ht, the players who are called
upon to act by the scheme, St(ht), have a strict incentive to carry on the prescribed deviation.
We say e ¾ is a subgame-preferable deviation from ¾ if 9S 2 C such that e ¾ ÂS ¾. Given the
partial ordering ÂS constructed above, and a closed subset e Σ of feasible strategy proﬁles, I can
deﬁne ¾ 2 e Σ to be an unimprovable strategy proﬁle in e Σ for dynamic coalition S, if there does not
exist any e ¾ 2 e Σ such that e ¾ ÂS ¾. Again, I’ll denote by KS(e Σ) the set of unimprovable strategy
proﬁles in e Σ for dynamic coalition S.32
The construction of coalition-stable equilibria in repeated games parallels its construction
29Notice that mathematically, the notion s 2 2
N includes the possibility that s is an empty set of coalition.
30S 2 C if and only if 9ht 2 Ht such that St(ht) 6= ;.
31When St(ht) = ;, e ¾ Â
ht
St(ht) ¾ if and only if e ¾jht = ¾jht.
32Mathematically, KS(e Σ) ´ f¾ 2 e Σ : @e ¾ 2 e Σ; e ¾ ÂS ¾g is the unique von Neuman/Morgenstern stable set of
system (e Σ;ÂS), and inherits its mathematical properties such as compactness and non-emptiness.
11for stage games. It also consists of a sequence of intermediate deﬁnitions fΣpgn
p=1, represent-
ing successive reﬁnements of perfect Nash as an equilibrium theory of rational behavior. Let
jSj ´ j
S
ht2Ht;8t St(ht)j denote the size of a dynamic coalition S, and deﬁne C(p) ´ fS 2 C : jSj = pg
to be the set size-p dynamic coalitions. It is straight forward to verify that the set of subgame-
perfect Nash strategy proﬁles can be represented by Σ1 =
T
i2C(1) Ki(Σ0).33 Moreover, suppose Σm
has been previously deﬁned for m = f1;2;:::;p ¡ 1g, I can then set Σp ´
T
s2C(p) Ks(Σp¡1).
Deﬁnition 3. Σn is the set of coalition-stable equilibria in a n-player repeated game.
First note that since the deﬁnition of equilibria is non-recursive, it applies equally well to both
ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely repeated games. Moreover, when attention is restricted to 2-player repeated
games, this deﬁnition of equilibrium shares many common intuition laid out in the renegotiation-
proof literature:34 a perfect Nash equilibrium ¾ is coalition-stable, if there does not exist another
perfect Nash equilibrium ˜ ¾, such that after some contingency ht, players would jointly prefer to
renounce ¾ for ˜ ¾. Finally, because the construction of equilibria in repeated games parallels its
construction in stage games, it shares the same intuition that motivates this solution concept as
previously discussed in section 3. Hence the solution concept in repeated games may be best viewed
as a positive theory of strategic play, in an environment where players can openly communicate
prior to each stage of action, and that players can eﬀectively coordinate their behavior via coun-
terfactuals implied by the simplest rational theory.
5 Recursive Characterization in Inﬁnitely Repeated Games
From our deﬁnition of equilibrium and subgame-preferable deviations, it is obvious that for ﬁnitely
repeated games, we can use the standard backward-induction procedure and characterize the set
of equilibria recursively starting from the last period. However, this approach fails in inﬁnitely re-
peated games, since there is no last period. Nevertheless, in this section, I show the set of equilibria
has a surprisingly simple intertemporal structure, and its payoﬀ set can be characterized recursively
using an iterative procedure extending the algorithm pioneered by Abreu et al. (1990).
Since our construction of equilibria involves a sequence of intermediate deﬁnitions fΣpgn
p=1,
from sections 5.1 to 5.3, I’ll take Σp¡1 as given and focus on developing a procedure to obtain
Σp from Σp¡1. Section 5.4 makes use of these developments and proposes an iterative algorithm
to fully characterize the equilibrium payoﬀ set. Section 5.5 further simpliﬁes equilibrium charac-
33Sketch of proof: ()) Suppose ¾ 62 \i2C(1)Ki(Σ
0), then 9j 2 C(1) such that ¾ 62 Kj(Σ
0). Hence 9ˆ ¾ 2 Σ
0 such
that ˆ ¾ Âj ¾, i.e. 9ht such that Uj(®((ˆ ¾j;¾¡j);ht)) > Uj(®(¾;ht)). Hence ¾ is not subgame perfect. (() Suppose
¾ is not subgame perfect, then 9ht such that Uj(®((ˆ ¾j;¾¡j);ht)) > Uj(®(¾;ht)), and hence 9j 2 C(1); ˆ ¾ 2 Σ
0 such
that ˆ ¾ Âj ¾. Obviously, ¾ 62 Kj(Σ
0) ) ¾ 62 \i2C(1)Ki(Σ
0).
34See for example Farrell and Maskin (1989), Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Abreu et al. (1993).
12terization by optimal penal codes. Section 5.6 uses the recursive characterization to prove existence.
5.1 Equivalence Between One-Step Deviations and Finite-Step Deviations
This section marks the ﬁrst step in simplifying our characterization of equilibrium, and prepares
ourself for the recursive procedures developed in later sections. In particular, I show that to reﬁne
Σp from Σp¡1, it suﬃce to check one-step and inﬁnite-step deviations from size-p coalitions, because
a version of “no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation” principle holds for all ﬁnite-step coalitional moves.
The proof of this version of “no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation” principle follows directly from
our deﬁnition of subgame-preferable deviations and the usual intuition. Loosely speaking, for a
group of players to participate in an elaborate intertemporal scheme of deviation from an existing
agreement, we require each participant has a strict incentive to carry out the scheme, at every
contingency when her action is called upon. If this intertemporal scheme of deviation involves only
ﬁnitely-many step, then there is a last group of players who participate in the scheme, and each of
them must strictly prefers to deviate at the last step than to revert to the original arrangement.
Since participants at the “last step” essentially carry out an one-step deviation, immunity to one-
step deviations is suﬃcient for immunity to every ﬁnite-step of deviation.
To formally develop the above intuition, we need some new mathematical notations. Given
a strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ0, let Up;k(¾) denote the set of subgame-preferable deviations from ¾
carried out by some size-p dynamic coalitions that are active for at-most k periods.35 Deﬁne
Σp;k ´ f¾ 2 Σp¡1 : Σp¡1 \Up;k(¾) = ;g. In other words, Σp;k is the set of strategy proﬁles in Σp¡1
that are immune to subgame-preferable deviations in Σp¡1 by all size-p dynamic coalitions that are
active for at-most k periods. By construction, we have Σp = Σp;1 µ Σp;k 8k < 1.
Proposition 1. Σp;1 = Σp;k 8 1 · k < 1
It is important to note that Proposition 1 is invalid when k = 1. When considerations are
restricted to the set of unilateral deviations (p = 1), the standard approach is to approximate every
inﬁnite deviation by its ¿-period truncation for some large ﬁnite ¿. This can be done because, with
discounting, the payoﬀ from every inﬁnite-period deviation can be arbitrarily well approximated
by its ﬁnite-period counterpart, and hence this ﬁnite-period truncation is still a proﬁtable unilat-
eral deviation for the individual player. Hence the standard approach shows Proposition 1 can be
extended to k = 1 for the set of unilateral deviations.
The standard argument, however, does not work when the deviation involves more than a sin-
gle player. To see why, consider an inﬁnite repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in ﬁgure 5.
35Hence U
p;k(¾) = fe ¾ 2 Σ
0 : 9S 2 C(p); ¿ ¸ 0 s:t: e ¾ ÂS ¾; e ¾t = ¾t 8t < ¿ and Sk+t(hk+t) = ; 8hk+t; t ¸ ¿g.
13C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
Figure 5: A Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
When players are suﬃciently patient (± ¼ 1), the strategy proﬁle ˜ ¾ that speciﬁes playing (C;D) in
odd periods and (D;C) in even periods, is a subgame-preferable deviation from the strategy proﬁle
¾, that corresponds to the inﬁnite repetition of static Nash (D;D).36 Nevertheless, no ﬁnite-step
truncation of ˜ ¾ is a subgame-preferable deviation from ¾, since the player who plays C at the last
step necessarily wants to play D instead. As a result of this potential “discontinuity at inﬁnity”,
we’ll ﬁrst move on to develop a generalization of the powerful decomposition techniques of Abreu
et al. (1990) in section 5.2, and then come back for a more general proof of “no-gain-from-one-shot-
deviation” principle in section 5.3.
5.2 Self-Generation and Factorization
Since every continuation of a strategy proﬁle that is immune to ﬁnite-step deviations is itself im-
mune to ﬁnite-step deviations, we can recursively characterize the set of payoﬀs associated with
Σp;1 in the spirit of Abreu et al. (1990). Let the set of payoﬀs associated with Σp¡1 and Σp;1 be
denoted by V p¡1 and V p;1, respectively.37 I begin with the construction of a set-valued operator
Bp(¢) that captures the relationship between the set of promise utilities, and the set of payoﬀs
associated with admissible strategies with these promises.
Deﬁnition 4. Given an action proﬁle q 2 A, and a promise function ½ : A ! <n, an action-
promise pair (q;½) is p-admissible w.r.t. a closed set W µ V p¡1 if and only if
1. ½(q) 2 W 8q 2 A
2. 8s µ N; jsj · p, and 8˜ qs 2 fAigi2s s:t: (1 ¡ ±)u(˜ qs;q¡s) + ±½(˜ qs;q¡s) 2 V p¡1;
9i 2 s s:t: (1 ¡ ±)ui(q) + ±½i(q) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)ui(˜ qs;q¡s) + ±½i(˜ qs;q¡s)
Let Ei(q;½) ´ (1 ¡ ±)ui(q) + ±½i(q) be the payoﬀ for player i associated with the pair (q;½), and
use E(q;½) = fEi(q;½)gi2N to denote the vector of payoﬀ proﬁle for all players. I can deﬁne the
set-valued operator Bp(W) ´ fE(q;½) : (q;½) is p-admissible w.r.t. Wg38.
Deﬁnition 5. W ½ <n is p-self-generating if and only if W µ Bp(W).
36The payoﬀs corresponds to repeated static Nash ¾ is (1;1) 8t, while the payoﬀs from ˜ ¾ is approximately (2;2) 8t.
37Hence V
p¡1 = vfv(¾) : ¾ 2 Σ
p¡1g and V
p;1 = fv(¾) : ¾ 2 Σ
p;1g.
38When p = 0, we deﬁne B0(W) ´ fE(q;½) : ½(˜ q) 2 W 8q; ˜ q 2 Ag.
14Our set-valued operator is a generalization of the B(¢) operator deﬁned in Abreu et al. (1990),39
and hence it has similar mathematical properties such as monotonicity and upper hemicontinuity.40
Finally, the following lemmas show that we can extend their self-generation and factorization tech-
niques, and relate each p-self-generating set to payoﬀ proﬁles of a strategy in Σp;1, and associate
the largest ﬁxed point of Bp(¢) with the set V p;1.
Proposition 2 (p-Self-Generation). If W is p-self-generating, then Bp(W) µ V p;1.
Proposition 3 (p-Factorization). V p;1 = Bp(V p;1)
Intuition and proof of these propositions follow closely to the development in Abreu et al. (1990)
and are left to the Appendix.
5.3 A Generalized No-Gain-From-One-Shot-Deviation Principle
We are now ready to show that the “no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation” principle also applies to
inﬁnite-step coalitional deviation, and hence we can formally associate the largest ﬁxed point of
Bp(¢) with the set of payoﬀ proﬁles obtained from Σp. The intuition of the proof is as follows: if
¾ 2 Σp;1 is immune to every self-enforcing ﬁnite-step deviations, but ˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 is an inﬁnite-step
subgame-preferable deviation from ¾, then ˆ ¾ is necessarily a Ponzi-scheme in promise utilities along
the deviation path. Hence no such ˆ ¾ is feasible.
Theorem 2. Σp = Σp;1
Sketch of Proof Given ¾ 2 Σp;1 and suppose 9ˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 representing an inﬁnite-step subgame-
preferable deviation by some size-p dynamic coalition S 2 C(p). W.l.o.g., we can assume the
deviation starts at t = 0, i.e. ˆ ¾0 6= ¾0.41 Then for all histories ˆ ht = (ˆ q0; ˆ q1;:::; ˆ qt¡1) along the
deviation path induced by ˆ ¾,42 by deﬁnition of subgame-preferable deviation we have vst(¸t(ˆ ¾jˆ ht)) >
vst(¸t(¾jˆ ht)) 8t, where st = St(ˆ ht), and ¸t(ˆ ¾jˆ ht) and ¸t(¾jˆ ht) are the continuation strategies at ˆ ht
for ˆ ¾ and ¾, respectively.43 Since ¾ 2 Σp;1, no ¿-step deviation along ˆ ht is proﬁtable. Hence
8t; 9i 2 st vi(¸t(¾jˆ ht)) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)[
¿¡1 X
º=0
±ºui(ˆ qt+º)] + ±¿vi(¸t+º(¾jˆ ht+º))
39Bp(¢) is equivalent to the B(¢) operator in Abreu et al. (1990) when p = 1.
40See Lemmas 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
41If the inﬁnite-step deviation starts at ht 6= h0, then we can consider the continuation strategy proﬁle of ˆ ¾ at ht,
¸
t(ˆ ¾jht) 2 Σ









¿=t is the shift operator that deletes the ﬁrst t elements of ¾.
15Since v(¸t(ˆ ¾jˆ ht)) ¡ v(¸t(¾jˆ ht)) = (1 ¡ ±)[
P¿¡1
º=0 ±º(u(ˆ qt+º) ¡ v(¸t(¾jˆ ht)))] + ±¿[v(¸t+¿(¾jˆ ht+¿)) ¡
















vi(¸t(¾jˆ ht)) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)[
P¿¡1
º=0 ±ºui(ˆ qt+º)] ¡ ±¿vi(¸t+º(¾jˆ ht+º))
o
¸ 0
Hence 8t;¿ < 1; 9i 2 st such that




vi(¸t(ˆ ¾jˆ ht)) ¡ vi(¸t(¾jˆ ht))
i
In particular, for t = 0, since mini2s0fvi(¸0(ˆ ¾jˆ h0)) ¡ vi(¸0(¾jˆ h0))g = mini2s0fvi(ˆ ¾) ¡ vi(¾)g > 0
and ± < 1; 9ˆ ¿ < 1 such that maxi2s0 vi(¸ˆ ¿(ˆ ¾jˆ hˆ ¿)) > M 8M < 1. But this is impossible since the
set of feasible utility V 0 is compact and hence bounded in each dimension.
5.4 A Recursive Characterization of Equilibrium Payoﬀs
This section summarizes the developments in sections 5.1 - 5.3 by providing an iterative algorithm
which completely characterizes the equilibrium payoﬀ set V n. Therefore, we can use the tracing
procedure outlined in the proof of Proposition 2, and recover every equilibrium outcome of a given
inﬁnitely repeated game.
Our algorithm consists of n stages of set-valued iterations, where on each stage we take the limit
set of the previous stage, and iterate “downwards” until convergence using a ﬁxed Bp(¢) operator.
Hence each stage of our iterations is akin to the computational procedure described in Abreu et al.
(1990). To start the chain of iterations on each step, we need the following proposition:
Proposition 4. V p¡1 ¶ Bp(V p¡1) ¶ V p;1 8p ¸ 1
Theorem 3. Deﬁne W
p




















Theorem 3 suggests the following algorithm to characterize the equilibrium payoﬀ set V n: Start
with V 0 and iterate downwards using B1(¢) until convergence to approximate V 1. Given that V p¡1
has been previously characterized, compute V p by iterating downwards from V p¡1 using Bp(¢) until
convergence, and successively calculate V p for each p until p = n.
165.5 Optimal Penal Codes
The set-valued iteration procedure outlined in section 5.4 may be diﬃcult to implement in practice.
Fortunately, in this section I show that a version of Abreu (1988)’s optimal penal codes exists for
our solution concept. Hence every equilibrium outcome can be easily characterized, given these pe-
nal codes have been found. In section 6, I’ll show how to support collusion in an inﬁnitely repeated
Cournot duopoly game with renegotiation using the idea of optimal penal codes.
As in Abreu (1988), each optimal penal code ®i corresponds to one of the worst equilibrium
outcome paths for each player i 2 N. Notice that we do not need to tailor an optimal penal code
for any coalition of players. The insight is that to discourage a coalition of players from deviating,
it suﬃces to punish one of its member very harshly immediately after a group deviation has been
observed. Again, the stick-and-carrot structure of these codes guarantees the punished player has
an incentive to voluntarily participate in her own punishment.
Let ½i;p 2 argminfwijw 2 V p;1g denote the payoﬀ-proﬁle associated with the most severe pun-
ishment in Σp;1 for player i 2 N. We ﬁrst present a general proposition that leads to the existence
of optimal penal codes.
Proposition 5. w 2 V p if and only if there exists (q;½) p-admissible w.r.t. V p such that (1 ¡
±)u(q) + ±½(q) = w and ½(˜ q) 2 f½i;pgi2N 8˜ q 6= q.
Proof We only need to prove the only-if part. Since Σp = Σp;1 ) V p = Bp(V p), given
w 2 V p;9(q;½) p-admissible w.r.t. V p such that (1 ¡ ±)u(q) + ±½(q) = w. Hence 8˜ qs;jsj · p, with
(1¡±)u(˜ qs;q¡s)+±½(˜ qs;q¡s) 2 V p¡1, there exists i 2 s such that (1¡±)ui(˜ qs;q¡s)+±½i(˜ qs;q¡s) ·
(1 ¡ ±)ui(q) + ±½i(q) = Ei(q;½). Since ½i;p · ½i(˜ qs;q¡s) 8i 2 s, we have maxi2sfEi(q;½) ¡ (1 ¡
±)ui(˜ qs;q¡s)¡±½
i;p
i g ¸ 0. Deﬁne ˆ ½ by ˆ ½(q) = ½(q), and 8˜ q = (˜ qs;q¡s) 6= q,44 ˆ ½(˜ qs;q¡s) = ½
ˆ i;p where
ˆ i 2 argmaxi2sfEi(q;½) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)ui(˜ qs;q¡s) ¡ ±½
i;p
i g. It is straight forward to verify that (q;ˆ ½) is
p-admissible w.r.t. V p and E(q;ˆ ½) = w.
Let ¾i 2 Σn with v(¾i) = ½i;n be the worst equilibrium strategy proﬁle for player i, and let
®i ´ ®(¾i) be the outcome path associated with ¾i. Proposition 5 implies that we can use f®igi2N
as the set of optimal penal codes to support every equilibrium outcome. Moreover, these codes are
“simple” in the sense that the set of penal codes is history-independent, and that every deviation
is punished by restarting one of the codes in this set.
Notice that, however, our penal codes are diﬀerent from Abreu (1988)’s original proposal in one
crucial aspect: the choice of punishment may depend on the deviation. In particular, the player
44When ˜ q 6= q has multiple representations as ˜ q = (˜ qs;q¡s), pick the s with the smallest size jsj.
17i 2 s who is punished after deviation ˜ qs from an equilibrium outcome path ® = (q0;q1;:::) is chosen
by maximizing over i 2 s:
Ui(®) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)ui(˜ qs;q0;¡s) ¡ ±Ui(®i)
Hence the player selected to be punished is the player who has the most to lose from the coalitional
deviation, and therefore is “weakest link” of the coalition.45;46
5.6 Existence of Equilibrium
This section uses the recursive characterization developed in section 5.4 to prove existence of equi-
librium in inﬁnitely repeated games. The approach to existence proof is complicated by the fact
that, in general, inﬁnite repetition of an equilibrium in a stage game need not be an equilibrium in
the corresponding inﬁnitely repeated game. Fortunately, I can show that existence of equilibrium
in stage game is suﬃcient for existence in inﬁnitely repeated game.47 Moreover, since Theorem 1
implies generic existence of equilibrium in stage games, existence of our solution concept is guar-
anteed in behavior strategies in repeated games.48
In this section, let fΣ
p
stagegn
p=0 denote the corresponding concepts fΣpgn
p=0 in the stage game.
Our existence proof is implied by the following proposition:
Theorem 4. Σ
p
stage 6= ; ) V p 6= ;
Idea of Proof Notice that q 2 Σ
p
stage ) (1 ¡ ±)u(q) + ±w 2 Bp(fwg) 8w 2 V p¡1, since
players are induced to play the stage game if promise utilities do not vary with current action.
Since V p is the limit of the decreasing sequence fBm
p (V p¡1)g1
m=0 and Bp(¢) is monotonic, we have
Bm+1
p (V p¡1) = Bp (Bm
p (V p¡1)) ¶
S
w2Bm
p (V p¡1) Bp(fwg) 6= ; 8m ) V p 6= ;.
6 An Example of Repeated Cournot Duopoly with Renegotiation
This section uses an example of repeated Cournot duopoly game to illustrate the idea of optimal
penal codes developed in section 5.5. In particular, I’ll demonstrate how these penal codes, which
essentially represent a stick-and-carrot strategy on the individual level but a divide-and-conquer
strategy on the group level, can be used to support collusion even in the presence of renegotiation.
It is also interesting to note that since inﬁnite repetition of Cournot-Nash is the only perfect Nash
45I thank Jonathan Levin for suggesting this descriptive phrase to me.
46DeMarzo (1992) used a similar idea to support his solution concept for ﬁnitely repeated games.
47With minor modiﬁcations, our approach can also be used to prove existence in ﬁnitely repeated games.
48Please also refer to footnote 10 for a remark on the observability of players’ private randomization device in
repeated games.
18equilibrium that is also “weakly renegotiation-proof”,49 our theory gives a very diﬀerent prediction
compared to the solution concepts developed by Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Bernheim and Ray
(1989), who both predict that collusion is impossible in the current environment if renegotiation is
allowed.
Consider an inﬁnite repetition of the two-player stage game in Figure 6.50 Roughly speaking,
the game can be thought of as a symmetric, discrete, quantity-setting duopoly game played by two
ﬁrms, each of them may choose a low (L), medium (M), or high (H) output level. The unique
Nash equilibrium of the stage game is (M;M). Let ± be the discount factor. It could be easily
veriﬁed Cournot-Nash reversion can be used to support the “collusive” outcome f(L;L);(L;L);:::g
if and only if ± ¸ 4=7.
Firm 2
L M H
L 10, 10 5, 14 0, 6
Firm 1 M 14, 5 7, 7 -5, -2
H 6, 0 -2, -5 -15, -15
Figure 6: Repeated Cournot Duopoly with Renegotiation
Let ± = 1=2, so that Cournot-Nash reversion is not severe enough to support the “collusive”
outcome. Nevertheless, Abreu (1988) showed that f(L;L);(L;L);:::g can still be supported by the
following pair of optimal penal codes:
Q1 = f(M;H);(L;M);(L;M);:::g; Q2 = f(H;M);(M;L);(M;L);:::g51
His idea is that the collusive outcome can be attained if each ﬁrm fi = 1;2g is threatened with
the worst perfect Nash equilibrium outcome Qi in case of an unilateral deviation. Moreover, the
stick-and-carrot structure of these codes guarantees each ﬁrm has an individual incentive to follow
equilibrium recommendation at all histories. However, since these codes hurt both the innocent
and the guilty, and joint-deviations are not punished, ﬁrms jointly prefer to skip the “stick” phase
and jump directly to the “carrot” phase, whenever these penal codes are called for. It can easily be
checked that the resulting paths ˆ Q
1
= f(L;M);(L;M);:::g and ˆ Q
2
= f(M;L);(M;L);:::g cannot
serve as penal codes, since the guilty does not have an incentive to participate in his own punish-
ment.
49A perfect Nash equilibrium is “weakly renegotiation-proof”, if it is not possible to ﬁnd two diﬀerent histories, ht
and h
0
t, such that the continuation utilities given by the equilibrium strategy proﬁle at these two contingencies are
Pareto-ranked. Bernheim and Ray (1989) use the term “internal consistency” to represent essentially the same idea.
50This game is a modiﬁed version of the example given in Abreu (1988).
51Notice that Q
1 and Q
2 are the worst subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes for ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, respec-
tively, with the corresponding equilibrium payoﬀ proﬁle of (0;6) and (6;0).
19In the presence of renegotiation, I show that collusion can still be supported, if we adopt a
strategy of “divide-and-conquer” on the group level. This can be done by adopting a pair of less
aggressive simple penal codes, and by making joint-deviations punishable:
Q1¤ = f(L;H);(L;H);(L;M);(L;M);:::g; Q2¤ = f(H;L);(H;L);(M;L);(M;L);:::g
As in Abreu (1988), I require every unilateral deviation by ﬁrm i be punished by restarting Qi¤.
In addition, every joint-deviation along the path of Qi¤ is punished by restarting Qj¤ with j 6= i.52
Notice the way I punish joint-deviations is ﬁrst to divide the interest of the group on such devia-
tions, and then to conquer them by punishing at the “weakest link” of the group, i.e. the ﬁrm who
has the most to lose if it participates in the group deviation. Finally, these penal codes are optimal
in the sense that Qi¤ corresponds to the worst coalition-stable equilibrium outcome for ﬁrm i = 1;2.
We can easily verify that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from collusion if fQi¤gi=1;2 are
used as punishments. To see if ﬁrms have an incentive to deviate from either Q1¤ or Q2¤, Theorem
2 shows that we only need to check for one-shot deviations. First note that all unilateral deviations
can be checked in the usual manner. Moreover, the “stick-and-carrot” structure of each of these
penal codes implies joint-deviation from Qi¤ reduces promise utility of ﬁrm j 6= i. Hence we only
need to check the joint-deviation to (M;M), the only group deviation that is jointly proﬁtable in
the current period.
Suppose equilibrium recommends restarting Q1¤. If both ﬁrms follow the recommendation,
the payoﬀ-pair they received is (5
4;8). If both ﬁrms jointly deviate in the ﬁrst period, then the
payoﬀ-pair they receive is 1
2 ¢ (7;7) + 1
2 ¢ (8; 5
4) = (15
2 ; 33
8 ). Since ﬁrm 2 is made worse oﬀ by this
joint-deviation (33
8 < 8), she will not participate in the ﬁrst period. Now suppose both ﬁrms follow
equilibrium recommendation in the ﬁrst period, and they enter the second period with a promised
utility-pair of (5
2;10). If these ﬁrms jointly deviate in the second period, the utility-pair they re-
ceive is again (15
2 ; 33
8 ). But then obviously ﬁrm 2 would not like to participate since (33
8 < 10).
Moreover, there is no mutually beneﬁcial one-shot joint-deviation from f(L;M);(L;M);:::g, and
hence Q1¤ is immune to coalitional deviation starting from the third period. Finally, since the game
is symmetric, arguments for “renegotiation-proofness” of Q2¤ is analogous.
7 Conclusion
This section concludes by relating our theory to other solution concepts in the literature. We start
by comparing the theory to two benchmark notions of renegotiation-proofness – the concept of weak
52In this example, I can punish all joint-deviations from f(L;L);(L;L);:::g by either Q
1¤ or Q
2¤. In general,
however, the punishment path chosen can depends on the particular joint-deviation, even though the set of punishment
paths remains the same over all contingencies. Please refer to section 5.3 for a more precise statement.
20renegotiation-proofness proposed by Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Bernheim and Ray (1989),53
and a diﬀerent idea of renegotiation-proofness advocated by Pearce (1987) and Abreu et al. (1993).
As we shall see below, while each of these benchmark notions represents quite an extreme but
diﬀerent view over the power of current-period players in inﬂuencing the course of strategic play,
the view adopted by our theory is quite balanced, and is guided completely by the dynamically
consistent behavior of players. As such, our theory contributes to the literature by reconciling the
diﬀerence between these two benchmark notions of renegotiation-proofness, and by presenting a
coherent framework to analyze the problem of renegotiation.
The notion of weak renegotiation-proofness, ﬁrst introduced by Farrell and Maskin (1989) and
Bernheim and Ray (1989), represents a rather optimistic view concerning the renegotiation power
of current-period players in repeated games. This notion requires that no two points in the equilib-
rium payoﬀ set should be Pareto-ranked.54 The intuition is that if both ¾ and ˜ ¾ are candidates for
an equilibrium, but the payoﬀs associated with ¾ strictly Pareto-dominate those associated with
˜ ¾, then collective rationality of players should lead them to jointly abolish ˜ ¾ in favor of ¾, even if
˜ ¾ is recommended. Hence ˜ ¾ cannot be a candidate for a “renegotiation-proof” equilibrium.
While the argument for weak renegotiation-proofness is valid in stage games, as we have dis-
cussed in the third example (Figure 4) of section 4.1, it is in general invalid even in two-period
games. The problem is that the joint-deviation from ˜ ¾ to ¾ may require participation of players in
future periods. Since dynamic consistency implies players cannot commit themselves to a partic-
ular course of action, and since the usual Pareto-criterion compares only the utilities of players in
the current period but ignores the promises to players in the future periods, Pareto-dominance in
current-period utilities is in general not a suﬃcient condition for renegotiation. Hence players may
not be able to renegotiate to a better outcome in the current period, because the current agreement
to deviate may be further reneged in future.
As a consequence, even though weak renegotiation-proofness is an intuitively appealing re-
quirement, it implies players can make intertemporal binding commitment when renegotiating a
side-contract to deviate. Since an equilibrium agreement is required to be self-enforcing precisely
because we assume no commitment technology is available, the requirement of weak renegotiation-
proofness may not be appropriate in general.
On the other end of the spectrum, the notion of renegotiation-proofness adopted by the theories
of Pearce (1987) and Abreu et al. (1993) represents a rather pessimistic view over the renegotiation
53Bernheim and Ray (1989) labels the same idea internal consistency. This idea is also closely related to the
concept of internal stability advocated by Asheim (1991), and the idea of internally renegotiation-proofness proposed
by Ray (1994). Please refer to footnote 49 for a deﬁnition of weak renegotiation-proofness.
54When the game is only ﬁnitely repeated, this criterion is sometimes called Pareto dominance reﬁnement, which
says no two points in the equilibrium payoﬀ set in any subgame are Pareto-ranked.
21power of players.55 Embedded in their theories is the idea that, for a joint-deviation from one
perfect Nash equilibrium ˜ ¾ to another perfect Nash equilibrium ¾ to be credible, not only should
such a deviation give a strictly higher payoﬀ to every players in the current period, but it is also
required that under no circumstance would this deviation result in a lower payoﬀ to any player
in future. In essence, their theories give all future-period players a veto power to reject every
joint-deviation proposed by players at present, even though the joint-deviation may be one-shot
and therefore require no participation of players in future periods. Obviously, their requirement for
credible renegotiation may be too stringent.
Our theory adopts a balanced view on the renegotiation power of players, and is guided com-
pletely by concerns over their dynamically consistent behavior. Our theory neither allows players
to commit to strategic choices made in future, nor let future-period players who are uninvolved in
a deviation to block the strategic changes made by players at present. As such, our theory escapes
the diﬃculties associated existing benchmark notions of renegotiation-proofness discussed above,
and in a sense embraces diﬀerent conﬂicting views in the literature in a single coherent framework.
Our theory is related to the concept of Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium of Bernheim
et al. (1987), which described strategic outcomes in ﬁnitely repeated games where coalitional plans
to deviate could be kept secret from other players. The theory is also related to the concept of
Sustainable Social Norms proposed by DeMarzo (1992), who extended Strong Nash equilibrium
of Aumann (1959) to repeated games by considering strategy proﬁles that are not “sequentially
blocked”, a concept which is closely related to our notion of subgame-preferable deviations. Finally,
the idea developed here is also related to Osborne (1990), who considered how the signalling eﬀect
of an individual deviation can be used to reﬁne predictions in ﬁnitely repeated games.
The theory developed here proposed a solution to the problem of renegotiation, in an environ-
ment with no nature moves and with no private information. Extending the current theory to a
more general environment is a challenging but rewarding exercise and will be taken in future works.
Recently, Ambrus (2002) and Ambrus (2003) extends the concept of rationalizability of Bernheim
(1984) and Pearce (1984) to incorporate incentives of coalitions. It would also be interesting to
explore the relationship between our equilibrium concept and his rationalizability concept in future
works.
55Readers should note that the exact deﬁnition of “renegotiation-proof” equilibrium in Abreu et al. (1993) is slightly
diﬀerent from that of Pearce (1987), even though the general idea is the same.
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24A Existence of Equilibrium in Stage Games
Given ¾; ˜ ¾ 2 Σ0, we say ¾ Âp ˜ ¾ if and only if 9s µ N; jsj = p, such that ¾ Âs ˜ ¾. Deﬁne 4p(¾) ´ f˜ ¾ 2 Σ0 :
¾ Âp ˜ ¾g and 4s(¾) ´ f˜ ¾ 2 Σ0 : ¾ Âs ˜ ¾g.56 Obviously, 4p(¾) =
S
s;jsj=p 4s(¾) and deﬁne the nonempty
compact correspondence Ã
p : Σp¡1 ! co(Σp¡1) by Ã
p(¾) = co(Σp¡1) n 4p(¾).57
Lemma 1. If Σ0 is a nonempty, convex topological vector space and the payoﬀ proﬁle u(¢) is quasi-concave,
then i:) ¾ 62 cofˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 : ˆ ¾ Âp ¾g, and ii:) Ã




for every ﬁnite subset f¾1;:::¾mg of Σp¡1.
Proof i:) Obviously ¾ 6Âp ¾ since Âp is irreﬂexive. Suppose 9¾1;¾2 2 fˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 : ˆ ¾ Âp ¾g and ¸ 2 [0;1]
such that ¾ = ¸¾1 + (1 ¡ ¸)¾2. This implies 9s µ N;jsj = p such that ¾1 Âs ¾ and ¾2 Âs ¾.58 However,
by quasi-concavity of u(¢), us(¸¾1 + (1 ¡ ¸)¾2) ¸ us(¾1) ^ us(¾2) > us(¾) ) ¾ 6= ¸¾1 + (1 ¡ ¸)¾2, a
contradiction. ii:) Fix an arbitrary ﬁnite subset f¾1;:::;¾mg of Σp¡1 and pick ˜ ¾ 2 cof¾1;:::;¾mg. Assume
to the contrary that ˜ ¾ 62
Sm
i=1 Ã





i=1 4p(¾i) ) ¾i Âp ˜ ¾ 8i. But
˜ ¾ 2 cof¾1;:::;¾mg implies ˜ ¾ 2 cofˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 : ˆ ¾ Âp ¾g, a contradiction.
Theorem 1 If Σ0 is a nonempty, convex and compact topological vector space and the payoﬀ proﬁle u(¢)
is quasi-concave, then Σp is nonempty 8p · n.
Proof It is suﬃcient to show Σp¡1 nonempty ) Σp nonempty given quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ
proﬁle u(¢). Fix an arbitrary ˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1 and deﬁne ˜ Ã
p




p(ˆ ¾); ˜ Ã
p
(¾) = Ã
p(¾) 8¾ 6= ˆ ¾;¾ 2 Σp¡1 and let ˜ Ã
p
(¾) = co(Σp¡1) 8¾ 2 co(Σp¡1) n Σp¡1. Since
Ã
p is a KKM correspondence by lemma 1, ˜ Ã
p
is a KKM correspondence by construction.59 Moreover, Âs is
transitive 8s µ N implies Σp =
T










(¾). Hence we can prove non-emptiness of Σp by showing
that f˜ Ã
p
(¾) : ¾ 2 co(Σp¡1)g is a collection of compact sets with ﬁnite-intersection property. Pick an arbi-
trary ﬁnite subset f¾1;:::;¾mg of co(Σp¡1). Let M be the ﬁnite dimensional space spanned by f¾1;:::;¾mg
and deﬁne fFig1·i·m by Fi = ˜ Ã
p
(¾i) \ cof¾1;:::;¾mg. Since ˜ Ã
p
is a KKM correspondence, fFig1·i·m
is a collection of compact subsets of M satisfying cof¾i : i 2 Ag µ [i2A Fi for every subset of indexes




i=1 Fi 6= ; by KKM lemma. Since f¾1;:::;¾mg is arbitrary, the col-
lection f˜ Ã
p













Since G1(±) is isomorphic to each of its own subgame, by construction we have ¸
t(Σpjht) = Σp 8ht; 0 ·
p · n, where Σpjht ´ f¾jht : ¾ 2 Σpg is the restriction of Σp to history ht.
56For every ˜ Σ µ Σ
0, we denote 4
p(˜ Σ) = [¾2˜ Σ4
p(¾) and we deﬁne 4s(˜ Σ) analogously.







1 Âs ¾ and ¾
2 Â˜ s ¾ but s 6= ˜ s, it can be easily shown that ¸¾
1
ˆ s + (1 ¡ ¸)¾
2
ˆ s 6= ¾ˆ s, where
ˆ s = (sn˜ s) [ (˜ sns).
59Notice that 8¾ 2 Σ
p¡1 with ¾ 6= ˆ ¾; ˜ Ã
p


















p(ˆ ¾) [ Ã
p(¾).
25Proposition 1 Σp;1 = Σp;k 8 1 · k < 1
Proof Since Up;k(¾) ¶ Up;1(¾) 8¾ 2 Σ0;p ¸ 1; ¾ 2 Σp;k ) ¾ 2 Σp;1. Hence Σp;k µ Σp;1. Suppose
¾ 62 Σp;k, then 9ˆ ¾ 2 Σp¡1\Up;k(¾). W.l.o.g. we can assume the chain of subgame-preferable deviations starts
at t = 0. Therefore we have ˆ ˆ ¾ ´ ¸




suppose ¾ 2 Σp;1, then by deﬁnition of Σp;1 we have ¸




Lemma 2. Given W0;W1 µ V p¡1. If W0 ¾ W1, then Bp(W0) ¶ Bp(W1).
Proof Obvious from the deﬁnition of Bp(¢).
Lemma 3. W is compact ) Bp(W) is compact.
Proof Consider the pair (q;½) 2 A £ A £ W; W µ V p¡1. Deﬁne Rw(V p¡1) ´ f(q;½) : E(q;½) 2 V p¡1g.
Given s µ N; jsj · p, construct a strict partial ordering Às on Rw(V p¡1) as follows:
(q1;½1) Às (q2;½2) ,
(
Ei(q1;½1) > Ei(q2;½2) 8i 2 s
q1
¡s = q2
¡s; ½1 = ½2
Let ˆ Ks ´ f(q;½) 2 Rw(V p¡1) : @(ˆ q;ˆ ½) 2 Rw(V p¡1); (ˆ q;ˆ ½) Às (q;½)g. Since both A £ A £ W and V p¡1 are
compact, and E(q;½) = (1¡±)u(q)+±½(q) is continuous in (q;½), we have both Rw(V p¡1) and ˆ Ks compact
subsets of A £ A £ W. Moreover, (q;½) is p-admissible w.r.t. W if and only if (q;½) 2 \s;jsj·p ˆ Ks. Hence
f(q;½) 2 A£A£W : (q;½) is p-admissible w.r.t. Wg = \s;jsj·p ˆ Ks is compact. Therefore Bp(W) is compact
by continuity of E(q;½).
Proposition 2 If W is p-self-generating, then Bp(W) µ V p;1.
Proof By the axiom of choice, 8w 2 Bp(W), 9 ˆ Q : Bp(W) ! A, and ˆ P : Bp(W) ! A £ W such that
( ˆ Q(w); ˆ P(w)) is p-admissible w.r.t. W and E( ˆ Q(w); ˆ P(w)) = w. Hence for any w 2 W µ Bp(W), we can
construct ¾w 2 Σp;1 with v(¾w) = w as follows. First, recursively deﬁne ˆ Pt
w : Ht ! <n so that ˆ P0
w = ˆ P(w)
and ˆ Pt
w(ht) = ˆ P( ˆ Pt¡1
w (ht¡1))(qt¡1) 8t ¸ 1. Since ˆ P(w) 2 A £ W whenever w 2 Bp(W), and W µ Bp(W),
by induction, we have ˆ P(w) 2 A £ W ) ˆ Pt
w(ht) 2 W µ Bp(W) 8ht 2 Ht; t < 1. Let ¾w = f¾w;tg1
t=0
be deﬁned by ¾w;0 = ˆ Q(w); ¾w;t = ˆ Q( ˆ Pt¡1
w (ht¡1)) 8t ¸ 1. By construction, v(¾w) = w. Moreover, given
f ˆ Pt
wg1
t=0, p-admissibility w.r.t. the p-self-generating set W µ V p¡1 implies there does not exist proﬁtable
and self-enforcing one-step deviation ˆ ¾w 2 Σp¡1 by any dynamic coalition of size · p. Hence ¾w 2 Σp;1.
Since this is true for 8w 2 Bp(W), therefore Bp(W) µ V p;1.
Proposition 3 V p;1 = Bp(V p;1)
Proof We only need to prove V p;1 µ Bp(V p;1). Given w 2 V p;1; 9¾ 2 Σp;1 such that v(¾) = w.
Let (q;½) be such that q = ¾0; ½(q) = v(¸
1(¾jh1=q)). Obviously, E(q;½) = (1 ¡ ±)u(q) + ±½(q) =
(1 ¡ ±)u(¾0) + ±v(¸
1(¾jh1=¾0)) = v(¾) = w. Also, ¾ 2 Σp;1 ) ¸
1(¾jh1) 2 Σp;1 8h1 2 H1 ) ½(q) 2 V p;1 8q.
Moreover, by deﬁnition of Σp;1;(q;½) is p-admissible w.r.t. V p;1. Hence w 2 Bp(V p;1).
26Proposition 4 V p¡1 ¶ Bp(V p¡1) ¶ V p;1 8p ¸ 1
Proof When p = 1, it is obvious that V 0 ¶ B1(V 0) since V 0 = fv(¾)j¾ 2 Σg is the set of payoﬀ proﬁles
from all feasible strategy proﬁles. When p > 1, given w 2 Bp(V p¡1); 9(qw;½w) p-admissible w.r.t. V p¡1 such
that (1¡±)u(qw)+±½w(qw) = w. If w 62 V p¡1, since ½w(q) 2 V p¡1 8q 2 A; 9s; jsj · p¡1, and ˜ qs 2 fAigi2s
such that (1 ¡ ±)u(˜ qs;qw
¡s) + ±½w(˜ qs;qw
¡s) 2 V p¡1 and Ei((˜ qs;qw
¡s);½w) > Ei(qw;½w) 8i 2 s. This implies
(qw;½w) is not p-admissible w.r.t. V p¡1, a contradiction. Hence Bp(V p¡1) µ V p¡1 8p ¸ 1. Moreover, since
V p¡1 ¶ V p;1, monotonicity of the Bp(¢) operator implies V p¡1 ¶ Bp(V p¡1) ¶ Bp(V p;1) = V p;1.
Theorem 3 Deﬁne W
p




















Proof By iterating on the monotone operator Bp(¢) and applying Proposition 4, we have
V p¡1 ¶ Bp(V p¡1) ¶ ::: ¶ Bn
p(V p¡1) ¶ ::: ¶ V p;1
Then by deﬁnition of W
p







k ¶ V p;1. Moreover, since Bp(¢) maps
a compact set to a compact set, W
p
k is compact 8k, and therefore Wp
1 is also compact. Also, because the
graph of Bp(¢) is compact, by closed graph theorem, Bp(¢) is upper hemi-continuous, hence Wp
1 µ Bp(Wp
1).
Then by Proposition 2, Wp
1 µ V p;1 ) Wp
1 = V p;1. Finally, Theorem 2 implies V p;1 = V p, hence Wp
1 = V p.
Lemma 4. Given q 2 A; q 2 Σ
p
stage , (1 ¡ ±)u(q) + ±w 2 Bp(fwg) 8w 2 V p¡1
Proof The lemma is obviously true when p = 1. Suppose the lemma is true for p ¡ 1, and ﬁx some
w 2 V p¡1. If q 2 Σ
p
stage, then 8s; jsj · p, and 8˜ qs 2 fAigi2s with (˜ qs;q¡s) 2 Σ
p¡1
stage, there exists i 2 s such
that ui(q) ¸ ui(˜ qs;q¡s). This implies 8s; jsj · p, and 8˜ qs 2 fAigi2s with (1¡±)u(˜ qs;q¡s)+±w 2 Bp¡1(fwg),
there exists i 2 s such that (1¡±)ui(q)+±wi ¸ (1¡±)ui(˜ qs;q¡s)+±wi. Hence (1¡±)u(q)+±w 2 Bp(fwg).
The proof in the other direction is completely analogous.
Theorem 4 Σ
p
stage 6= ; ) V p 6= ;
Proof Since repetition of a Nash equilibrium for the stage game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
for the inﬁnitely repeated game, the statement is true when p = 1. Suppose the statement is true for
p ¡ 1. Therefore Σ
p
stage 6= ; ) Σ
p¡1
stage 6= ; ) V p¡1 6= ;. Hence Bp(¢) is well deﬁned and by Theorem 3,
V p = B1
p (V p¡1). Suppose V p = ;. Since the sequence fBk
p(V p¡1)g1
k=0 consists of non-increasing compact
sets having ﬁnite intersection property, V p = ; ) 9m < 1 such that Bm
p (V p¡1) 6= ; but Bm+1
p (V p¡1) = ;.
However, by lemma 4, Σ
p
stage 6= ; ) Bp(fwg) 6= ; 8w 2 V p¡1. Hence monotonicity of Bp(¢) implies
Bm+1
p (V p¡1) = Bp (Bm
p (V p¡1)) ¶
S
w2Bm
p (V p¡1) Bp(fwg) 6= ; since Bm
p (V p¡1) µ V p¡1, a contradiction.
Hence V p 6= ;.
27